





Abstract: We tend to think of allusions as indirect references to objects that
already exist. Here I argue against this post facto orthodoxy and for the view
that certain cases of allusion count as ex ante allusions (i.e. allusions before the
fact). I argue that the standard view conflates the epistemic dependence of al-
lusion (knowledge of the object of allusion) with an existential dependence (the
object must already exist). As an adequate account of allusion should explain both
the apparent paradoxical character and the possibility of ex ante allusions, I pro-
pose that literary allusions should be understood in terms of what might be called
reference from rather than reference to.
We tend to think of allusions as indirect references to objects that already
exist. Here I challenge this post facto orthodoxy, and propose an alternative
account of literary allusion not as reference to but as reference from. In par-
ticular, I argue that the notion of ex ante allusion—literally ‘from before,’ i.e.
to objects that do not yet exist—is perfectly coherent despite its paradoxi-
cal veneer, that there are actual examples of such allusions in select literary
works, and that although these examples are generally hard to verify, the fact
that they do exist suggests important revisions to our concept of allusion.
To begin, take the definition proposed by William Irwin in his important
philosophical analysis, ‘What Is an Allusion?’: Irwin defines allusion as ‘a
reference that is indirect in the sense that it calls for associations that go
beyond mere substitution of a referent’1—we might compress this for now
into ‘reference by association.’ What Irwin intends here is twofold: first,
to distinguish allusion from other sorts of reference, typically more direct
references; second, to identify the psychological mechanism (i.e. association)
c© Aesthetic Investigations Vol 1, No 1 (2015), 14-22
Jason Holt
that makes it work and that characterizes its special indirectness. To take an
example, in Leonard Cohen’s poem ‘Thousand Kisses Deep,’ the lines ‘And
maybe I had miles to drive / And promises to keep’ rather clearly allude to
Robert Frost’s ‘Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening,’ in particular the
lines ‘But I have promises to keep, / And miles to go before I sleep. . . ’2 By
contrast, and taking Irwin’s definition strictly, the phrase ‘the gloomy Dane,’
though certainly a reference to Hamlet, is too direct (as it constitutes ‘mere
substitution of a referent’) to be an allusion to Hamlet, though perhaps not
too direct to be used to allude to Hamlet.
For a discussion case, Irwin offers ‘I am not Prufrock’ as a candidate
allusion, though not to the character in Eliot’s poem ‘The Love Song of J.
Alfred Prufrock.’ It is an allusion rather to some facet(s) of the subject
that we are meant to associate with the Prufrock character in the poem—
whatever that might be, perhaps that the subject does not consider himself
as insignificant or as life having passing him by.3 This is clearly a literary
reference, and we even sometimes speak of such references as literary allusions
even though the literary referent is not identical to the object of the allusion.
We may sympathize with the complaint that such a literary reference is too
direct to constitute a literary allusion insofar as it is not itself referred to by
association; rather, it is the literary basis of the allusion to something else,
and in this sense we should distinguish two types of literary allusion: allusion
to a literary work (as with Cohen’s allusion to Frost) versus allusion through
a literary work (as with the Prufrock example). I suggest that we designate
these ‘type 1’ and ‘type 2’ literary allusions, respectively. Although allusions
can occur outside the confines of literature and art generally—allusions that
have nothing to do with art; neither in, nor about, nor that use it at all—it
is artistic, and chiefly literary, allusions that concern me here.
To understand the associative link between allusions and their objects it
will be helpful to revisit Hume’s distinction among principles of association.
The Treatise famously distinguishes among three principles by which ideas
suggest one another: resemblance, contiguity, and causation.4 It is by re-
sembling the person that a portrait tends to make one think of the person.
Likewise, it is by the resemblance between Cohen’s ‘miles to drive/promises
to keep’ and Frost’s ‘promises to keep/miles to go’ that Cohen alludes to
Frost. Turning to contiguity, thinking about Canada may bring to the mind
its neighbour to the south, the United States. In the same way, at a pre-
sentation characterized by unusual levels of bombast and platitude, I might
whisper to a colleague ‘So he advises Laertes,’ thus alluding to Polonius, a
contiguous character in the same play. In this way too we can allude to a
work by quoting it, in that the quotation is contiguous with the other parts
that together constitute the whole. Although it may not be immediately ap-
parent, the principle of causation also figures into allusion. In typical cases,
the object of allusion inspires, and so is part of the causal story behind, the
allusion itself. More important for my purposes, if I am correct in my claim
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that there is such a thing as ex ante allusion, the associative principle of
causation will help explain how such allusions work.
I
Before arguing that the notion of ex ante allusions is coherent, however, it
makes sense first to outline what I call the post facto orthodoxy, which is part
of the standard view of allusions that, both pre-critically and theoretically,
sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, denies the very possibility of
ex ante allusions.
Consider first various characterizations of allusion in prominent literary
reference books. A New Handbook of Literary Terms: ‘When a literary work
engages in allusion, it refers to—plays with, makes use of— earlier pieces
of literature (or, sometimes, history)’ (emphasis added).5 The New Prince-
ton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics defines allusion as the ‘deliberate
incorporation of identifiable elements from other sources, preceding or con-
temporaneous, textual or extratextual’ (emphasis added).6 Even when such
a restriction is not explicitly put on allusion, it is usually, if less obviously,
present in the form of an implication; for instance, take the definition of
allusion from the Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms:
An indirect or passing reference to some event, person, place, or
artistic work, the nature and relevance of which is not explained by the
writer but relies on the reader’s familiarity with what is thus
mentioned (emphasis added).7
Although there is no explicit requirement here that the object of allusion
already exist, this does seem to be implied by the stress placed on reader
familiarity, for a reader cannot be familiar with a text or something else
that does not yet exist. This is what I mean by the phrase ‘the post facto
orthodoxy,’ which amounts to ruling out the possibility of ex ante allusions,
since these different characterizations of allusion are intended to express not
just what is typical of such reference but what is essential to it.
The post facto orthodoxy is not merely part of the establishment view of
allusion as expressed in literary reference books. It is a commitment shared
by many philosophers as well. Consider first the conceptual analysis proposed
by Göran Hermerén, which amounts to the following necessary and sufficient
conditions. According to Hermerén, an allusion has occurred if an only if:
(1) The artist intended to make beholders think of the earlier work by
giving his work certain features. (2) As a matter of fact beholders
contemplating his work make associations with that earlier work. (3)
These beholders recognize that this is what the artist (among other
things) intended to achieve (emphasis added).8
Leaving aside the fact that some objects of allusion are not works of art,
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this is a clear, explicit commitment to the post facto orthodoxy. We likewise
see such a commitment in the explication of allusion (specifically in film)
offered by Noël Carroll:
Allusion, as I am using it, is an umbrella term covering a mixed lot of
practices including quotations, the memorialization of past genres, the
reworking of past genres, homages, and the recreation of “classic”
scenes, shots, plot motifs, lines of dialogue, themes, gestures, and so
forth from film history (emphasis added).9
As above, even when it is not explicitly part of a definition of allusion, the
post facto orthodoxy tends to reveal itself in the interpretation of the defini-
tion’s scope. For instance, although Irwin’s definition of allusion as reference
by association does not obviously rule out ex ante allusions, in developing his
account Irwin makes perfectly clear that he embraces the restriction. As he
puts it, ‘Only a divine author, outside of time, would seem capable of alluding
to a later text.’10
Irwin makes this claim as if it were not expected to be in any way con-
troversial. Indeed, it is not particularly controversial, which reflects the fact
that the post facto orthodoxy is often taken for granted, and so constitutes
an important yet, I argue, challengeable part of the conventional view of
allusions.
II
Let us turn now to three candidate cases for the label ‘ex ante allusion,’
which I have chosen for various reasons. The first two cases are intended
to demonstrate the coherence of the concept, to stand as possible cases of ex
ante allusion. The third case, though rather obscure by contrast with the first
two, is intended to stand not merely as a possible instance but as a confirmed
actual case.
The first case comes from Ernest Hemingway and The Sun Also Rises.
The book’s protagonist is Jake Barnes, and the novel is written in the first
person from Jake’s perspective. There is reason to interpret Jake as Heming-
way’s fictional stand-in, including the common interpretation of the novel as
a roman à clef. Early on in the novel, another character, Robert Cohn, in
the context of what can only be described as an existential conversation, asks
Jake, ‘Do you know that in about thirty-five years more we’ll be dead?’11
Note that: thirty-five years; and note that the novel was originally copy-
righted and first published in 1926. Add 35 to 1926, and you get 1961; and
1961 was the very year Hemingway committed suicide!12 At the very least,
the juxtaposition of such a fictional prediction with covert real-world impli-
cations, apparently fulfilled many decades after the fact, is apt to give one
pause.
To be absolutely clear here, my claim is not that this necessarily is a case
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of ex ante allusion. My claim is only that it might be. It is at least possible
that Hemingway had the intention, in 1926, to commit suicide thirty-five
years later, and that he also had an intention to allude, covertly, to this
eventuality by putting the prediction in the mouth of a fictional character
addressing, in fictional disguise, Hemingway himself. I admit, openly, that
this case is likely just a coincidence, that the timing of the suicide was not
deliberate or, if it was, had nothing to do with the novel’s apparent if merely
possible prediction. Well and good. The point remains, however: although
this was, in all probability, mere coincidence, it might not have been. The
suicide might have fulfilled an ex ante allusion, and if so, what an astonishing
moment in literary history!—Hemingway coming to fulfil the prophecy of
his first great work, and thereby enhancing its greatness, with a unique and
profound, ultimately the grandest, gesture.
The second case comes from Leonard Cohen, and is similar to the first
insofar as it is intended to demonstrate the coherence of the concept of ex ante
allusion without serving as a verifiable case, at least given the information
now available to us. Whereas Hemingway is dead, Cohen is, at the time
of writing this essay, still living, and so unlike Hemingway might provide
evidence that his case counts, or fails to, as ex ante allusion. The case is as
follows: in his 2001 song ‘That Don’t Make It Junk,’ Leonard Cohen speaks of
having closed, as he calls it, the Book of Longing. This could well have been
an ex ante allusion to his poetry collection published five years later, Book
of Longing.13 That is, Cohen could have written the line about closing the
Book of Longing with the intention of alluding to an envisioned but not then
existing work. I am not suggesting that an intention to allude is sufficient
for an allusion to have occurred, but rather only that such intent is a key
ingredient of and so good evidence for allusion.14
There are two reasons why this might not count as an ex ante allusion.
First, Cohen might have written the line and only later come to consider that
it would make a good title. In this case the possible ex ante allusion may
simply reduce to typical self-influence. Second, it might seem too direct a
reference to count as an allusion proper. Although the first concern cannot
be answered at this point, something may be said to the second. Although it
seems ‘the Book of Longing’ is a rather direct reference to Book of Longing, it
is rather perhaps more indirect than it appears. The original phrase includes
the definite article, lacks italics, and in context is better interpreted not as
a book in its own right but as either a metaphorical book or an imagined
biblical book. In any event, if this reference is too direct, it might have been
made less directly. So again, even if we cannot say for sure that this is an
actual case of ex ante allusion—that it may amount to no more than post
facto influence, that it might be too direct—it could have been otherwise and
so further illustrates the possibility of such.
The third case is an obscure one but, in a way, more to the point, illustrat-
ing, I claim, not merely the coherence of the concept, but an actual case of ex
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ante allusion. An experimental novel was published in 2003 by a relatively un-
known writer named Jason Holt, bearing the title The Black Books Addiction.
Nothing in the novel itself suggests the title, except for the paperback’s cover,
which is self-referentially black. Any expectation of exploring the suggested
theme of literature-as-narcotic is disappointed by the novel itself, although
ultimately fulfilled by the author’s 2009 follow-up, A Tangent at 3:15, which
takes literature-as-narcotic as its key plot point. Unlike the Hemingway and
Cohen cases, where we as yet lack information to confirm or confute an ex
ante hypothesis, in this case the author has confirmed the intention, when
writing the 2003 book, to allude to the then-unwritten one.15 The presence of
such an intention allows us to rule out the confuting possibilities remaining
live in the Hemingway and Cohen cases. This obscure novelist has, it seems,
provided us with a verified case of ex ante allusion.
III
In discussing ex ante allusions and their implications I want to explain both
why they have such a paradoxical veneer and why it is only that, a veneer. I
also want to sketch a view, suggested by this discussion, of literary allusions
as reference from rather than reference to.
First, at least part of what makes ex ante allusions seem paradoxical is
a failure to appreciate the distinction between the object of allusion being
extant and the object of allusion being known. In typical allusions, the object
is known in virtue of, among other things, existing already. Cohen’s allusion
to ‘Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening,’ for instance, depends on his
knowing that poem, which is knowledge he would not have if the poem did
not exist. This is not because such knowledge depends on the poem already
existing, but because, given Frost’s authorship, Cohen was not in a position to
have such knowledge until the poem had already been written. However, this
is decidedly not the case for Cohen’s epistemic access to his own envisioned
but unexecuted works—e.g. the possible ex ante allusion to Book of Longing.
This is obviously a special kind of knowledge, the knowledge on which ex
ante allusions depend, as the same person is responsible, as alluder, both for
the allusion itself as a kind of prediction, and for fulfilling the prediction by
bringing the object into existence later on. Whether this counts as knowledge
by description or a special kind of knowledge by acquaintance—through the
vision that inspires and shapes the later object’s creation—such knowledge,
though special, is indeed possible.
Skepticism about ex ante allusions could be motivated by the fact that
very often we might not be able to tell whether we have an ex ante allusion
rather than an instance of the far more common phenomenon of post facto
influence. But this does not alter the fact that there is a real difference be-
tween these ex ante and post facto scenarios, a difference both causal and
psychological, even if we are rarely able to sift the ex ante from the post
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facto. Even if Cohen never reveals it—and artists, we know, are often coy
about such things—there is a fact of the matter about whether he had al-
luded ex ante to Book of Longing. Skeptics may also note that in the end
ex ante allusions amount to a special and interesting form of foreshadowing,
and no one doubts existence of such a common artistic device. Of course
the key difference between common foreshadowing and ex ante allusions is
that typical foreshadowing is of later elements in the same work, where ex
ante allusions take objects that are decidedly extrinsic to the work. Other
interwork connectors, such as cliffhangers, will often seem less like ex ante
allusions and more like formal placeholders for future filling in.16
The paradoxical veneer of ex ante allusions owes in no small part, I sug-
gest, to their promissory nature. Indeed, an intended ex ante allusion may
not come off because its envisioned object does not, for whatever reason,
come into being. There is, in other words, a kind of fragile contingency
unique among allusions to the ex ante variety. That such an allusion may
not come off, however, does not mean that when it does come off, it is not
what it was intended to be. There are various respects in which ex ante
allusions exhibit such a promissory character. First, until their objects even-
tuate, and whatever the author’s intentions, there will be no shared reference
with readers—although one of the lessons of modernism seems to be that the
opacity of an allusion is no mark against its status as such. Ex ante allusions
are also promissory in that they are arguably part of works that remain, until
their objects eventuate, incomplete. They are finished works, to be sure, as
they need no more work to be done on them, yet still lacking some of their
raw material, they are not yet complete.17 Third, ex ante allusions also have
an element of self-fulfilling prophecy, and until fulfilled they remain allusions
in progress.18 This is why they suggest Hume’s view of causation qua prin-
ciple of association of ideas. The reference-by-association of an allusion can
be achieved ex ante when it itself is productive of, or deliberately part of the
causal fabric that ends up producing, its eventual object. An ex ante allusion
is its object’s causal precursor. Once the elusive object has been realized,
readers may associate it with its allusive precursor whether or not they can
discern its ex ante status.
If ex ante allusions do belong in the taxonomy of allusions alongside more
garden variety sorts, they help motivate changes to our concept of allusion be-
yond such inclusion, or in other words, beyond mere rejection of the post facto
orthodoxy. To return to our earlier examples, we might reconsider whether
typical literary allusions, be they type 1 (Cohen alluding to Frost) or type
2 (alluding through Prufrock), as references by association, are actually ref-
erences to literature at all. Suppose we try to account for such reference in
terms of a somewhat naïve Fregean story in terms of which Cohen’s use of
‘miles to drive. . . promises to keep’ alludes to Frost’s ‘promises to keep. . .miles
to go’ in virtue of expressing a sense that determines such reference. Well
and good, except for that fact that (1) this neither accounts for the asso-
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ciative mechanism of allusion nor differentiates it from typical reference; (2)
it therefore neglects the typical point of allusions, which is subsidiary, often
ornamental, as far as their main reference is concerned—in the Cohen case,
certain possibilities (‘And maybe I. . . ’), in the Prufrock case, an unidentified
subject (‘I am not. . . ’); (3) it also therefore fails to respect ex ante allusions’
veneer of paradoxicality, since it is not even seemingly paradoxical to simply
refer, in the usual way, to something in the future.
To account for the allusive part of such references, and their subsidiary,
associative, mediating role, and to respect the apparent paradoxical nature of
ex ante allusions, I propose that we recast literary allusion as reference from
rather than reference to, in that the main reference is achieved in such cases
via the literary object: allusion to as reference from. In type 1 cases, like
the Cohen example, reference to the literary object (e.g. certain possibilities)
is from the allusive object (e.g. Frost). Type 2 cases, conversely, exhibit
reference from the literary object (e.g. Prufrock) to the allusive object (e.g.
the unidentified subject). Here we also respect the paradoxical veneer of ex
ante allusions: ‘the Book of Longing’ (perhaps) referring from the later Book
of Longing to the then-current metaphor, ‘thirty-five years more’ (perhaps)
referring from Hemingway’s eventual suicide to The Sun Also Rises’ fictional
future, ‘the black books addiction’ (definitely) referring from the later book
(as plot point), to the earlier one (as title). Thus allusion to as reference from
makes sense of such references as a type of framing device.
Having argued this for ex ante allusions both as a coherent possibility and
a plausible actuality, and after exploring briefly some of the implications of
this position, including an account of literary allusion as reference from, I
conclude by acknowledging skepticism about whether this account of can be
generalized to account for all allusions. This skepticism owes quite simply to
the fact that some allusions no doubt are made for their own sake alone, and
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